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There has been a recent identification of a need for a New Business History. This discussion connects with the 
analytic narrative approach. By following this approach, the study of business history provides important 
implications for the conduct and institutional design of contemporary industrial policy. The approach also 
allows us to solve historical puzzles. The failure of the De Lorean Motor Company Limited is one specific 
puzzle. Journalistic accounts that focus on John De Lorean’s alleged personality defects as an explanation for 
this failure miss the crucial institutional component. Moreover, distortions in the rewards associated with 
industrial policy, and the fact that the objectives of the institutions implementing the policy were not solely 
efficiency-based, led to increased opportunities for rent-seeking. Political economy solves the specific puzzle; 
by considering institutional dimensions, we can also solve the more general puzzle of why activist industrial 
policy was relatively unsuccessful in Northern Ireland. 
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 ‘[I]n contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every 
man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this 
interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and 
ambition, co-operate to public good’1 
 
‘Eternal vigilance is the price of dishonesty’.2 
 
‘[W]hen people ask my advice about investing in Mr De Lorean’s venture I tell them to put money into wine, 
women and song. They’ll get the same return and have more fun’ 3  
 
Introduction 
 
There is a need for the creation of a ‘new business history’ as de Jong, Higgins and 
van Driel have identified.4 This paper provides an illustration of one path that such a project 
could take. The focus on methodology in the paper by de Jong, Higgins and van Driel reflects 
the wider trend that has occurred within business history during the last decade.5 The turn has 
included calls for a discussion on the methodological directions that any ‘new business 
history’ should follow.6 The continued focus on single firms within business history, as noted 
by de Jong, Higgins and van Driel, is not the source of the methodological problems faced by 
business historians. Studying single firms may actually highlight the need for more general 
(analytic) models. The use of such models, as de Jong, Higgins and van Driel observe, will in 
turn enable business historians to connect particular business systems, entrepreneurs or firms 
to more general insights. 
Moreover, as argued here, such general insights may have implications related to 
contemporary policy needs as well as historical puzzle solving. This ability to solve historical 
puzzles, as well as greater policy focus, may help renew business history.7 As some eminent 
scholars have recently observed, economists are increasingly aware that economic historians 
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can offer policy lessons from history and debunk myths.8 These authors suggest that a greater 
policy focus will promote the fortunes of economic history. Business historians should follow 
suit in the trend towards more general policy relevance.  
The methodological position criticised in this paper is the (usually implicit) Whiggish 
assumption that business historians have tended to make by studying only successful 
organizations. N.S.B. Gras, for instance, argued that dishonest actors would eventually be 
outcompeted in the world of business.9 Consequently, there is a danger in simple biological 
analogies (or Whiggish historical interpretation) that corporate survivors are superior in some 
robust way and that failed firms are of trivial historical importance.10 Note also that the 
Whiggish assumption does not offer much in the way of policy lessons. 
Contemporary commentators are more sceptical of the Whiggish approach. These 
commentators suggest that simplistic evolutionary arguments are excessively optimistic.11 
The “analytic narrative” developed later reinforces the contemporary perspective on business 
history and uses Public Choice arguments to reject the Whiggish interpretation. Hume’s 
observation that institutions needs to be designed to control knavish behaviour, illustrated in 
the quote at the start of this paper, anticipates Public Choice. James Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock were the pioneers of the Virginia approach to Public Choice. This perspective was 
defined by James Buchanan as ‘the analysis of political decision-making with the tools and 
methods of economics’.12 Buchanan argued that Public Choice offered a theory of 
governmental failure precisely analogous to the theory of market failure provided by 
theoretical welfare economics.13 Moreover, Public Choice scholars interpret institutional 
factors as a cornerstone in historical and economic understanding.14 
A Whiggish approach to business history ignores the fact that, depending on the 
institutional environment, entrepreneurship can be destructive or unproductive rather than 
productive. Firms may be able to engage in rent-seeking rather than profit-seeking as a way 
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of remaining in business.15 As Buchanan observed, firm profit-seeking adds value for society 
and is thus productive, but rent seeking does not.16 Rent-seeking behaviour may keep a firm 
in business by altering the institutional environment in its favour (thereby ensuring it will 
survive by enjoying positive private returns); however, such an outcome will be socially 
wasteful. Therefore, at any point of time, firm survival (if it is based on rent-seeking) will not 
provide a socially optimal form of natural selection. For the purposes of understanding the De 
Lorean debacle, as well as considering the more general puzzle of the overall failure of 
industrial policy in the Northern Irish context, it is particularly important to note the 
empirical observation made by economists that the industrial policies pursued during the 
Troubles failed to translate into efficiency improvements.17 This understandable focus on 
efficiency, however, downplays the political economy dimensions that helps resolve the 
general puzzle as well as more specific puzzle of a famous commercial failure. Policymakers 
after the outbreak of unrest had to balance efficiency objectives in industrial policy (such as 
closing the productivity gap or promoting greater competition) with the need for security and 
political stability. The desire to promote any economic benefits associated with creative 
destruction was thus often offset by the need to pursue conflicting objectives. 
In terms of structure, we first identify the specific historical problem or puzzle at hand 
– namely explaining the failure of The De Lorean Motor Company Limited (DMCL). There 
was no shortage of cash or entrepreneurship. Indeed, it is notable that an entrepreneur, with 
previously such a glittering career, as well as a government so willing to devote resources to 
the project would end up with such a costly failure. Identifying inadequacies in the factors of 
production cannot resolve the specific puzzle. Despite a state of the art factory equipped with 
the best machinery, and an enthusiastic workforce desperate to prove themselves, the 
business was in receivership only a year after production started. Solving this (apparent) 
puzzle will lead us to the institutional ‘analytics’ – in this case the Virginia Public Choice 
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tradition, and the rent-seeking subfield within that larger literature. This political-economic 
analysis is then linked to theoretical models of competition and industrial policy and how 
such a theoretical approach relates to the historical discussion by Crafts on the role of 
competition and rent-seeking in the economic performance of Britain and Northern Ireland. 
Rent-seeking, which had been suppressed during the 1960s by institutional reform, re-
emerged as a problem against the institutional backdrop of political instability and counter-
terrorism.  
Such an analytical and more policy-focused approach enables the business historian 
moreover to go beyond the insights that a purely archival-driven approach delivers, as 
traditionally practiced by business historians. In the later ‘narrative’ sections of the paper, the 
analytic narrative will be developed by presenting historical evidence that demonstrates that 
solving the puzzle concerning the failure of DMCL is more explicable by invoking rent-
seeking than pop psychology. Institutional factors misdirected entrepreneurship; it was 
possible for opportunistic entrepreneurs to mould institutions in their favour. DMCL was the 
most extreme example of a more general problem. 
 
Using economics to identify and solve the puzzle(s) 
 
Analytic narratives are a subset of a wider “economic” approach to business or 
economic history – one that is arguably more compatible with business history than standard 
cliometrics, which is itself a branch of empirical economics. Economists’ standard approach 
is to formulate a puzzle or puzzles. As already observed, the specific puzzle in this case is 
explaining the failure of DMCL, which was The De Lorean Motor Company (DMC) factory 
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based in Dunmurry, Northern Ireland. In resolving this puzzle, a finding with general 
application is that explaining the failure requires the business historian to consider not only 
the flaws in the business model of DMCL (and by implication DMC), though they were 
considerable, but also recognise the distortions of the institutional environment under which 
DMCL operated. Once these distortions are recognised, any puzzle(s) surrounding DMCL 
and/or DMC’s (henceforth DMCL) failure is (are) resolved and provide clues to explaining 
the more general puzzle concerned with explaining the failure of regional industrial policy. 
From the establishment of the John Z. De Lorean Corporation in 1974 to the 
receivership of DMCL in 1982, as well as De Lorean’s arrest the same year with cocaine with 
an estimated value of between $14 million and $16 million, was marked in equal measure by 
controversy, scepticism and media interest.18 DMCL produced a car developed from 
Giorgetto Giugiaro’s iconic car design, a design that served famously as the time machine in 
the Back to the Future film trilogy. The enterprise was an expensive failure underwritten by 
the UK taxpayer.19 The Northern Ireland Audit Office (NIAO) has calculated the total cost to 
the taxpayer at £77 million between 1978 and 1982.20 Recently released files put the total 
cost figures, which include the compensation for damages associated with civil disturbances 
at the location, at between £83.9 million and £84.3 million.21 
McKinsey was commissioned by the Northern Ireland Industrial Development 
Agency (NIDA) to provide advice on the operation of the firm and it provided monthly 
progress reports. The fees of these and other consultants do not appear in the official figures. 
Nor do the opportunity costs to the taxpayer figure appear. Industry insiders observed that 
even if only £60 million (at 1978 prices) was the total cost of the venture to the taxpayer this 
still ensured that the subsidy per job was (at £30,000) three times the usual cut-off point for 
industrial promotion expenditure.22 Yet even these figures, because they ignore the resources 
devoted to engage in and prevent rent-seeking, underestimate the total social waste. The 
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excessively generous subsidy package offered to attract the project to Northern Ireland points 
to existence of the additional rent-seeking costs.  
 
 
Institutions and analytic narratives in economic and business history 
 
The analytic narrative approach may take the form of a detailed country study 
informed by growth economics and the institutional or political economy literatures.23 Rodrik 
noted that as of 2003 there remained few such papers.24 Yet the combination of institutional 
and historical analysis with modern economic analysis, as represented by the approach, is 
part of a long-established ‘family tree’ within economics. It has most directly evolved from 
the new institutionalism that emerged during the 1970s. While a range of definitions can be 
found, Ronald Coase’s focus on how institutional structures - including the legal systems, 
political system and social system - shapes economic performance, gives a flavour of what 
new institutionalism does and does not involve.25 Given Coase’s Chicago School outlook 
then, the analytic narrative approach may be traceable back to Chicago’s Law and Economics 
tradition. 
It is possible to classify modern social science along the lines of “thick” or “thin” 
theory and “dirty” or “clean” empirical work. “Thick” description, as exemplified by much 
anthropology, highlights the ideographic (particularizing) aspects of a study. In contrast, 
“thin” or nomothetic (generalizing) theory dominates economics. Likewise, economists 
favour “clean” empirical work – such as quantitative work in the form of regression; social 
scientists outside of economics, particularly historians or sociologists, tend to employ “dirty” 
empirical techniques such as archival study, interviews and ethnography. Analytic narratives 
attempt to resolve historical puzzles by reconciling the benefits of “thin” description with the 
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advantages of “dirty” empirics. Boettke, in the matrix illustrated in Table 1, has attempted to 
provide a simple classification of analytic narratives in relation to three other approaches to 
historical social science.26  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
It is possible to reduce the methodological guidelines for conducting a study based on 
analytic narratives down to the following four characteristics: 
Firstly, research within analytic narratives is a puzzle (or problem) - driven not 
theory-led endeavour.27 The historical phenomenon that forms the basis of such a study can 
be investigated by conducting research based on reading primary sources and/or secondary 
sources. The need for researchers to be intimate with detail suggests that qualitative materials 
are required.28 The immersion in the sources will enable the rational strategic interaction 
between historical actors to be isolated29; 
Secondly, the strategic interaction amongst the actors having been identified, the 
relationship between actors can be studied more formally. Some writers highlight the role of 
institutions as self-enforcing equilibriums that coordinate behaviour. Often, but not always, 
such a formalization involves the use of game theoretic analysis.30 It is essential nevertheless, 
that the rational choice model chosen – game theoretic or not - bears some similarity to the 
actual choices and tradeoffs that actual actors faced in the historical phenomenon in question; 
Thirdly, the completed model now requires a narrative or “thick description” to be 
introduced. The purpose of such a narrative is to provide an explanation of the meaning 
actors attach to their actions, circumstances and surroundings, that is their significance within 
the local culture31; 
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Fourthly, once a rational choice framework is chosen, the historical analyst can 
compare the model’s predictions along with the outcomes that can be identified from the 
historical record. When the rational choice model fails to predict (or at best can only suggest 
a multiple equilibrium outcome) the narrative will need to be engaged to explain, which other 
factors isolated from the model, account for the outcome.32 
Influential papers by North and Weingast (1989) and Greif (1994) are examples of 
research that exemplifies the analytic narratives perspective.33 Recent examples of such 
studies in economic history journals that cover institutions, multiple equilibria and rent-
seeking include papers by Drelichman, Koyama, and Rubin.34 The approach until recently 
has made little impact on the writing of business history; this situation is beginning to 
change.35  
 
 
Analytics: from institutions to entrepreneurship 
 
 Probably the most influential discussion of the connections between institutional 
environments and entrepreneurship derives from Baumol’s seminal paper.36 Discussing the 
volume of and intensity of entrepreneurship in his article, Baumol observed that institutional 
structures are a determinant of the distinct form of entrepreneurship a particular society faces. 
Baumol’s suggestion that some institutional environments and arrangements, with their 
associated sets of payoffs, have historically been more compatible with productivity-
increasing technological innovations than others.37 He noted that entrepreneurship has 
historically not always been of the productive variety. Institutions tend to determine both the 
level and type of entrepreneurship and he identified three types: productive, unproductive and 
destructive. Institutional pathologies may ensure that pay-offs are skewed towards rewarding 
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redistribution favouring sectional interests rather than in return for productive 
entrepreneurship.38 In extreme cases of dysfunctional institutional payoffs, the relative 
rewards for rent-seeking may be so high that entrepreneurs will lead a parasitical existence 
that will damage wider economic performance.39 
 
 
Analytics: from entrepreneurship to institutions  
 
 Baumol’s analysis indicates that institutions can determine the balance between 
productive, unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship. However, Public Choice analysis, 
reflecting Hume’s argument, suggests that a feedback loop exists whereby opportunistic 
entrepreneurs may alter institutional environments to suit their own interests. In such 
situations, government intervention may be more a curse than a blessing. Baumol’s original 
analysis has been refined in a number of influential papers that enable us to construct an 
analytic narrative. The analysis by Murphy et al is concerned with how a country’s most 
talented people choose to seek returns.40 The paper thus is concerned with how incentives in 
a society promote rent-seeking or profit seeking. Table 2 illustrates the factors that promote 
rent-seeking rather than more socially useful forms of economic behaviour. Murphy et al 
present a model as well as empirical material that demonstrates the causes and impacts of 
rent-seeking. The analysis indicates that lawyers are damaging for growth, and engineers are 
good. According to these authors, the distortions from rent-seeking are threefold: it absorbs 
labour, it makes the least able entrepreneurs choose to become workers and it turns the ablest 
people, who are crucial for growth promotion, into rent seekers.  
 
 [Table 2 Here] 
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Acemoglu develops further the analysis of Baumol and Murphy et al.41 Of most 
relevance to later sections of the paper, Acemoglu finds that the reward structures that 
determine the allocation of talent are endogenous. Furthermore, a multiplicity of equilibria 
and path dependency may occur: initial differences in rewards and/or allocations (for 
example due to region-specific factors) will have long-run effects as allocations of one 
generation shape rewards for the next. Acemoglu concludes that his model implies that 
reward structure determines the allocation of talent, but he acknowledges that a reverse chain 
of causation may exist in some historical episodes.42 Following Baumol’s distinction between 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship, Nunn develops a model that exhibits multiple 
equilibria, in order to provide a partial explanation of African economic underdevelopment.43 
Nunn’s analysis includes some secondary historical literature survey. As with Acemoglu’s 
paper, the combination of the model and history indicates that initial differences (such as 
disease incidence) can be a profound influence on institutional-economic outcomes.44  
Henrekson and Sanandaji’s contribution is to accept that Buchanan’s insights 
transform Baumol’s unidirectional framework into one with a feedback loop.45 They observe 
that just as institutions can channel entrepreneurial supply into productive, unproductive or 
destructive behaviour, so entrepreneurs can (by choosing to abide, evade or alter institutions) 
determine institutional creation and evolution.46 Evasive entrepreneurship aims at 
circumventing the institutional framework, while some entrepreneurs may use political 
activity to alter institutions.47 An outline of these definitions is outlined below in Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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The observed allocation of entrepreneurship in the real world, according to Henrekson and 
Sanandaji, is determined by the relative payoffs between the abiding, evading and altering 
forms of behaviour. The vertical distinctions in Table 3 (from productive to 
unproductive/destructive) are separate from the horizontal ones (abide, evade or alter). 
Henrekson and Sanandaji observe that altering and evading forms are possibilities excluded 
from Baumol’s analysis. Henrekson and Sanandaji observe that the same individual can 
switch between different forms of behaviour. An entrepreneur for instance can introduce a 
new product one year and use a frivolous lawsuit – a less socially beneficial form of entry 
barrier - the next.48  
 
Analytics: competition, rent-seeking and industrial policy in theory and application 
 
 The contemporary theoretical analysis of competition and industrial policy and the 
extent to which competition determined UK economic performance are important 
components in explaining the economic weaknesses that Northern Ireland exhibited prior to 
the arrival of DMCL. At the theoretical level, recent research indicates that industrial policy 
should be implemented in a way that promotes competition.49 Along these theoretical lines, 
Aghion et al (2012) demonstrate that subsidies should not be concentrated on a particular 
firm in a particular industry. Instead, their formal analysis suggests that industrial policy is 
more likely to promote growth if subsidies are offered on an equal footing to more than one 
firm.50 They conclude that the focus of industrial policy should be to be to design sectoral 
policies in order to promote a more competition-friendly and high-growth outcome.  
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In political economy terms, the less concentrated (and more competition-friendly) the 
allocation of state aid to a particular sector is, the less incentive there will be for any firm to 
lobby for that aid. The analysis of competition and industrial policy provided by Aghion et al 
indicates that competition-friendly industrial policy will minimise the resources devoted to 
lobbying. Thereby the waste associated with rent-seeking will be minimised if industrial 
policy promotes competition. The theoretical framework developed by Aghion et al 
complements the more applied approaches to the relationship between competition and 
economic outcomes. Crafts’ recent work on long-run UK economic performance 
acknowledges that failures in educational, fiscal and monetary policy as well as shortfalls in 
human and physical capital accumulation have all contributed to poor performance.51 
However, Crafts argues that competition deserves more prominence in the economic history 
literature.52 He identifies the weakness of competition from the 1930s to the 1970s as 
undermining British productivity growth.53 Moreover, Crafts demonstrates that since the late 
1970s a greater policy emphasis on competition has promoted supply-side improvements that 
have ended relative economic decline.54 
There is an important political economy component within the approach taken by 
Crafts: he recognised that securing higher productivity may be good economics, but ‘it may 
be quite challenging’ politically to get interest groups to see how the benefits of ‘creative 
destruction’ outweigh the losses to themselves.55 This political economy focus is particularly 
pertinent to solving the puzzle of DMCL’s failure. Crafts’ analysis of the role of competition 
in explaining relative UK economic decline (and renaissance) relates to his earlier findings on 
the sources of Northern Ireland’s failure to keep pace during the Golden Age.56 Crafts 
observed the existence of ‘a rather worse version’ of Britain’s industrial relations and the 
disadvantages associated with ‘soft’ peripherality (such as access to information) hindered 
business in Northern Ireland. He contended that industrial policy failures compounded the 
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situation.57 Such observations are consistent with claiming that by the 1950s the Northern 
Irish economy faced a region-specific set of problems. Not only did magnified versions of 
British weaknesses exist, but also obstacles unique to the region also tended to reduce 
productivity growth. 
 Crafts identified that a ‘political economy context’ influenced the region’s observed 
efficiency failures.58 However, he did not explain why the incentives facing politicians and 
policy agencies were so perverse. Brownlow provided such an explanation by studying the 
archival sources and applying rent-seeking analysis.59 He observed that (and unlike in 
Britain) there was minimal oversight of the disbursement of grants in Northern Ireland. Such 
a situation after 1945 was of advantage to local political leaders with commercial interests in 
declining industries seeking subsidies. Beneficial institutional change occurred in 1963; 
Northern Ireland’s regulations governing conflict of ministerial interests were brought into 
line with Britain’s. Empirical evidence indicates that such institutional changes (combined 
with a more generous industrial policy) were associated with a boost to the quantity and 
quality of inward investment that raised economic performance between 1963 and 1972.60 
Prior to the arrival of DMCL, there were three interrelated categories of economic 
problems within Northern Ireland. A first set of problems were the supply-side weaknesses 
that it shared with the rest of the UK. Failures of macroeconomic policy can be placed in this 
category. A second category of problems involved magnified versions of weaknesses found 
in the rest of the UK. Unemployment was for example a much greater problem than 
elsewhere in the UK. Long-term unemployment was particularly acute.61 Competition was 
weaker than in Britain during the Golden Age. The Safeguarding of Employment Act, 1947 
for example prevented the free flow of workers from Britain.62 Only when the UK joined the 
Common Market was the Act reversed. The politically powerful linen industry hindered 
restructuring by attempting to act as a monopsony in segments of the female labour market. 
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The detrimental consequences of weak competition are mentioned in the pioneering 
Economic Survey of Northern Ireland (1957).63 Isles and Cuthbert, the authors of the survey, 
argued that both management and workers required greater efficiency and that restrictive 
practices needed to be eliminated.64 They suggested that weak competition – in the form of 
entry barriers - hindered the regional economy: 
 
The limited size of the provincial market for many goods and the ease with which in some trades petty 
monopolies can be formed, at any rate in sheltered trades, may have helped to develop an attitude of mind which 
prefers safety though restriction to the chance of prosperity through enterprise and growth.65 
 
Isles and Cuthbert were particularly concerned that the ‘attitude of restriction’ would be 
particularly damaging in industries that served other sectors.66 Monopoly and restrictive 
practices for example beset the coal trade.67 A third group of economic problems were those 
unique to the region’s circumstances. The negative economic effects of peripherality 
(particularly in its ‘softer’ form) could be placed in this category. It has been suggested that 
soft peripherality acts as an obstacle to prosperity, because Northern Ireland lagged 
economically it made it difficult for businesses to find the funds and/or access the 
information needed to keep pace with competition in Britain. This alleged inability to create 
up-to-date goods and services, associated with economic backwardness caused by isolation, 
in turn further hinders regional competitiveness. Soft peripherality is claimed to be associated 
with cumulative causation as initial disadvantage can breed long-term disadvantage.68 
Likewise, after 1969 the economic implications of civil unrest would further damage an 
already weak regional economy.  
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Narrative: the institutional and economic environment, 1971-1978 
 
Having outlined the relevant analytical issues in terms of the distortions that emerged 
prior to the 1970s, we can now turn to interpreting the historical narrative. On the security 
side, violence by the middle of the 1970s was starting to decline from the peak levels of the 
early years of the Troubles. Figure 1 illustrates this trajectory.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Investment, particularly inward investment, was particularly weak after 1969, but the extent 
to which this weakness was due to violence rather than a legacy of the excessive reliance on a 
‘branch plant syndrome’ is part of a wider counterfactual debate beyond the direct focus of 
this paper.69 Applying the allocation of talent model mentioned earlier to the situation we 
could hypothesis that violence reduced the economy’s growth potential and increased the 
social wastefulness associated with rent-seeking. As outlined in Table 4, an important 
complication to addressing this bleak economic picture was the uneven distribution of 
unemployment between the two communities. This situation, with its security and political 
implications, made British governments after the introduction of direct rule in 1972 
particularly eager to create jobs in areas with large concentrations of Catholic unemployed. 
An estimated unemployment rate of 80 per cent in the housing estates neighbouring 
Dunmurry existed.70 
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[insert Table 4 here] 
 
The Northern Ireland Development Programme, 1970-75, published in 1970, and 
which outlined a strategy for economic progress, was increasingly irrelevant after the upsurge 
in violence that accompanied the introduction of internment in August 1971.71 The 
intensification of violence led to the commission of the Cairncross report. The Cairncross 
report recognized that violence, with its resulting collapse in investor confidence, was 
hindering the development of existing and potential investment. The report diagnosed that 
private sector entrepreneurship needed support. The authors prescribed the creation of 
Northern Ireland Finance Corporation (NIFC) to support investment as ‘a lender or subscriber 
of the last resort’. Endowed with a £50 million fund, the NIFC was to offer loans and 
guarantees. It would provide funds to what officials regarded as sound businesses (primarily 
manufacturing enterprises) threatened with closure or contraction due to violence.72 The 
report advocated bringing forward public expenditure as a supplementary measure. 
The organisational architecture under which industrial policy operated changed after 
the introduction of direct rule. The NIFC was replaced with the Northern Ireland 
Development Agency (NIDA) in May 1976 and a new Northern Ireland Economic Council 
(NIEC) was created to advise the Secretary of State. The Cairncross analysis was also 
updated and its interventionist prescription was extended by Belfast based officials in an 
‘Economic and Industrial Strategy for Northern Ireland’ (henceforth the Quigley report) 
published in 1976. Investment levels, according to this report, were not going to increase 
‘until the psychological barrier presented by the security and political situation has been 
lifted’.73 However, the analysis within the Quigley report was more interventionist than in 
Cairncross. For example, the authors concluded that it was ‘inevitable that the State should 
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itself assume the role of entrepreneur’.74 The report claimed that the public sector would pick 
winners as it could take greater risks than the private sector and it could ensure that jobs were 
located in locations that private enterprise would not choose. Such interventionist arguments 
provided a manifesto for officials supporting DMCL. However, the shift towards intervention 
also had an adverse selection implication, as it left officials vulnerable to opportunistic 
entrepreneurs (such as John De Lorean) who discovered that securing generous subsidy 
packages was an easier task in Northern Ireland than elsewhere. 
 
 
Narrative: Enter De Lorean 
 
Journalists have attributed the failure of DMCL to John De Lorean’s switch between 
Jekyll and Hyde behaviour variously to ‘delusion’, a ‘narcissistic personality’ driven by an 
‘exaggerated sense of entitlement’ combined with ‘a sense of reality...distorted beyond 
reason’.75 De Lorean became ‘a prisoner of his own vision’ in the words of one of these 
accounts.76 Such psychological speculations, while making for entertaining journalism, do 
not offer a particularly insightful way of solving the puzzle of the firm’s failure. The narrative 
material in the remainder of this paper demonstrates that the political economy insights 
presented earlier in the paper provide a more convincing explanation. 
De Lorean is a particularly interesting example of the Jekyll and Hyde tendencies 
identified in the earlier analytical sections of this paper. His example is one that offers 
interesting insights for an economist interested in applying Public Choice insights to business 
history. As an entrepreneur, De Lorean responded opportunistically to a set of incentives 
based on the desperation of officials and politicians for inward investment; this opportunistic 
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behaviour involved rent-seeking activity. Once located in Dunmurry, he tried to manipulate 
institutions to his commercial advantage. For example, the original contract that De Lorean 
negotiated regarding locating DMCL in Dunmurry was legally vague enough that he could 
use provision 4(j) as a bargaining chip to extract further concessions, even going to the extent 
of attempting to use legal threat to get additional money.77 De Lorean combined the ability to 
innovate, with an intense ability for lobbying and legalistic manoeuvring.  
Even his sternest critics, a category that includes the same journalists who attributed 
his failure to a narcissistic personality, acknowledge he had engineering skills that 
approached genius.78 De Lorean held 52 patents at the US Patent Office (31 were for GM) 
when he created his ill-fated car firm.79 De Lorean’s undoubted engineering ability and 
associated capacity for productive entrepreneurship, as demonstrated by his many patents, 
was therefore not in doubt by the time he formed DMC. Yet even at the time of peak sales for 
the DMC-12, expenditure on legal fees exceeded the advertising budget.80  
He was also a consummate rent-seeker able to engage in unproductive and destructive 
forms of entrepreneurship. The GPD Services Incorporated (GPD) episode as well as his 
involvement in a cocaine deal demonstrated his propensity for illegally evading institutions.81 
De Lorean’s use of the political situation in order to secure further grants was a clear attempt 
at legally altering institutions.82 Moreover, he was extremely opportunistic in his behaviour 
before, during and after his tenure at GM. His talent for political lobbying was impressive but 
- as in the case of his negotiations with the Irish Republic’s Industrial Development Authority 
(IDA) - he could miscalculate. De Lorean located production in Dunmurry. He did not locate 
in Puerto Rico or the Republic of Ireland because the oversight in Northern Ireland was 
weaker and crucially the subsidy package was more generous: it was easier to secure rents, 
and the rents on offer were greater than the alternatives. 
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A 1977 confidential report conducted by the First National Bank of Chicago presents 
probably the most prophetic, and certainly the most damming, investment analysis of DMC. 
The report was conducted on behalf of Ojjeh Akram, a potential Saudi investor in the project 
when it was still to be located in Puerto Rico.83 First National suggested that, in a world of 
high oil prices, the market for cars had changed. Consequently, an ‘ethical’ sports car of the 
type De Lorean was going to produce would not have adequate demand.84 Hobbled by weak 
demand prospects and potentially strong cost and competitive pressures, the report concluded 
that shareholders equity would show a deficit of $20-25m.85 Predictably, Ojjeh Akram 
walked away from the deal at the end of April. 
De Lorean by 1978 had repeatedly tried to bend the rules to his own advantage. Such 
bending was legal in some cases, but it was illegal in other cases. De Lorean’s agreement-
bending tendencies extended to contracts: ‘John always felt contracts were interesting pieces 
of paper and no more’ as one former colleague succinctly expressed it.86 De Lorean’s 
repeated statements that marketing was the most important determinant of motor industry 
success provides an additional explanation for professional investor scepticism.87 Conversely, 
De Lorean’s gift for marketing, his high profile image as an entrepreneur and high profile 
lifestyle attracted high profile investors from the entertainment industry: Sammy Davis Jr. 
and Johnny Carson were two celebrity investors.88 John De Lorean’s chequered business 
career, flamboyant image, marketing focus and extravagant reputation as well as the 
commercial failure in 1975 of the Bricklin SV-1 were all contributing factors in deterring 
many institutional investors.89  
Public sector agencies competed to attract this inward investment venture. The 
relatively rapid pace of the negotiations may provide a partial explanation for the 
substantially better deal that De Lorean secured from the NIDA. He played cat and mouse 
with Fomento for 18 months. The IDA considered the project for five months before rejecting 
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it. The three deal-breakers for the IDA were, firstly, De Lorean’s claim that he wanted the 
firm to be an adjunct of Ford and Chrysler, manufacturing a separate line of luxury sedans 
and sports cars.90 Secondly, the IDA had well worked out vetting procedures.91 Thirdly, De 
Lorean miscalculated in his negotiations aimed at securing rents from the IDA: while 
Desmond O’ Malley, the Irish industry minister, was keen on the project, De Lorean’s 
lobbying of the industry minister annoyed senior IDA officials, and O’Malley’s influence 
was not what De Lorean assumed. Ministers did not make the final decisions at the IDA and 
De Lorean’s aggressive lobbying cemented the IDA’s rejection.92  
It took 46 days, from initial introductions to formal contracts, to persuade the British 
government to dip into their coffers to locate the firm in Dunmurry. On June 21 1978 
between the Department of Commerce, NIDA and the De Lorean Motor Company an 
agreement was established. 93 De Lorean’s firm between 1974 and 1978 had raised barely $5 
million; in the span of a month and a half, the coffers had swelled twenty-fold.94 While De 
Lorean would tell the media the financial incentives for locating in Northern Ireland were 
attractive, he would also suggest they were not compelling. Yet they were approximately 
three times as much as the IDA offer and twice those in Puerto Rico.95 That was more than 
enough compulsion (or additional rent) for De Lorean. 
How exactly the project eluded the grasp of Puerto Rico remains somewhat murky, 
but it is sufficient to note that De Lorean, despite signing an exclusivity agreement with 
Puerto Rican authorities, attempted to wrangle better deals. Senior officials from the 
Department of Commerce and the NIDA, as well consultants from McKinsey acting on 
behalf of the NIDA, studied De Lorean’s corporate plan. The board of NIDA approved the 
project on July 13th 1978.96 The NIDA’s formal offer of assistance occurred in August 1978 
(an offer amended in April 1979).97 The formal offer bound the NIDA to consider making 
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further loans to the firm in the case of events beyond the control of the firm (the formal 
documentation explicitly mentions factors such as exchange rates and interest rates). 
The McKinsey commentary on the corporate plan placed the chances of DMCL 
managing to succeed, on the terms De Lorean had projected, at around 40 per cent.98 
McKinsey suggested that the scale of the public investment was a large risk. Demand for the 
vehicle was uncertain and the supply-side risks were associated with high sunk costs. They 
observed that should the business fail then neither the £24 million machinery budget nor the 
factory space itself had much in the way of commercially viable alternative uses. Anticipating 
the Treasury’s misgivings about the project, the initial employment grant of £10m implied a 
fully employed cost per worker of £6500, which was extremely expensive.99 The 
commentary angered De Lorean sufficiently that his legal representative sent an aggressively 
worded telex in response. The McKinsey assessment was described as ‘a monument to the 
non-entrepreneur, who takes no risks and, therefore, never makes a mistake’. 100 A more 
measured response occurs in De Lorean’s formal written response. That document forecast 
that 30,000 units were to be sold at a price of $11,000 (or 9,000 units at $16,000). Estimated 
breakeven production for 1982 was 15,100 units.101 
De Lorean’s figures were to prove wildly optimistic. Supporters of the project could 
nevertheless point to the fact that the firm had commissioned such projections based on 
feasibility and market studies undertaken by a range of consultants, including Booz Allen 
Hamilton.102 Senior officials assessed any risks identified by McKinsey as being more than 
offset by the potential benefits.103 De Lorean’s forecast projections were considered 
plausible.104 An internal memo, authored by George Quigley, the Permanent Secretary at the 
Department of Commerce, assessed the project’s potential advantages and disadvantages; it 
came down very clearly on the positive side.105 Support for the project was summarised as 
follows: 
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‘Having looked the risks squarely in the face, the issue is simply whether the potential prize justifies the 
measure of risk clearly entailed. At the end of the day, this is primarily a political decision. My view would be, 
however, that, having regard to all the circumstances, the risk is justified’ My Italics. 106 
 
De Lorean’s autobiography tends to exaggerate the role that Roy Mason, the 
Secretary of State of State for Northern Ireland 1976-79, played; likewise, Mason’s 
autobiography defends the role he played in the episode. Mason argued that bringing De 
Lorean to Dunmurry was ‘one of the best things I ever did’.107 Of course, these 
autobiographies had clear motivations in extolling the virtues of Mason as a Secretary of 
State. Mason’s contribution was unarguably an important one as he helped transform 
Stormont enthusiasm into Whitehall cash; Mason was not actively involved in the 
negotiations. Furthermore, by no means was he the intellectual or administrative driving force 
for attracting De Lorean. Senior officials gave Mason the impetus. For instance, John 
Freeman, Deputy Chairman of the NIDA, invoked the Quigley analysis to encourage Mason 
to support the project.108 Mason transmitted this interventionist message to the Treasury. As 
outlined in a letter to the Chief Secretary, Mason claimed that, by creating jobs in West 
Belfast, the project had political, economic and security benefits.109 Joel Barnett for his part, 
expressing Treasury scepticism in the increasingly interventionist (and expensive) direction 
of industrial policy, countered with the worrying precedent of Strathearn Audio.110 
 
 
Narrative: DMCL in Dunmurry, 1978-1982 
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The vehicle finally made its public debut at the Ulster motor show in February 1981, 
and began its full-scale production the same month, but privately the British government had 
already lost faith in DMCL. The Treasury for its part argued the whole saga was connected to 
failures of forecasting and control at the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) as well as the limits 
of DMCL.111 As early as June 1980 the British government considered letting the firm 
collapse. The legal opinion at this stage was that the original contract left the government 
vulnerable if it refused to assist.112 However, it was political rather than legal or commercial 
considerations that kept the money flowing into DMCL.113  
The engineering and financial aspects of the relationship with Lotus and GPD, a 
Swiss-Based company, are of particular importance in explaining the failure. On the financial 
side, the pace at which government money flowed to Lotus was in greater quantities than 
anyone expected. Research and development work undertaken for DMCL was supposed to be 
paid to Lotus via GPD. A total of US $17.65 million (some £8.83 million) found its way to 
GPD following this route. DMCL paid GPD/Lotus a second pot of money, worth $23 million 
(£11.5 million) for additional development work. It was discovered subsequently that none of 
this first pot of money had been received by Lotus.114 In terms of the engineering part of the 
business, many of the subsequent design and quality control problems arose because of 
disagreements between engineers at Lotus and DMCL.115 Predictably, these disagreements 
caused quality control problems that in turn raised costs in order to make the car of saleable 
quality. These additional costs, compounded by the excessive executive pay and general 
extravagance of the business, contributed to making the firm extremely uncompetitive.116  
Table 5 illustrates the failure of the firm to create the promised jobs for much of its 
life.117 Ironically, by the time the firm was employing approximately the promised level of 
workers it was clear that the pessimistic forecasts of investment analysts were accurate: too 
many cars were coming out of the factory gates awaiting too few buyers. 
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
By December 1981, it was clear that while weekly production targets of 400 were being met 
there was insufficient demand.118 Fallon and Srodes aptly describe De Lorean’s negotiating 
tactics with the NIDA and British government as a combination of ‘pleading, threatening or 
blackmail’, and they observe that as time wore on it became a steadily less effective 
combination.119 However, Fallon and Srodes do not provide an explanation for this 
diminishing effectiveness: one clue is that De Lorean was well aware that the more workers 
hired at DMCL, the harder it was politically to close the venture. On the other hand, he must 
have equally been aware that a larger workforce with greater production implied even higher 
levels of unsold cars and higher costs.  
De Lorean became ever more desperate as sales stagnated, the firm’s cash flow 
worsened and it seemed likely the car would never reach the market. Behind the scenes in 
Stormont and in London, he used legalistic bargaining lobbying in an attempt at extracting 
further concessions. Simultaneously he used his high media profile for the same ends. In his 
media utterances, he increasingly blamed civil unrest for his commercial problems. Civil 
servants drafted press releases and rebuttals to these public utterances.120 In private 
negotiations with the British government, De Lorean argued that as the physical assets were 
government-owned, until the car reached the market, the firm had no security for a loan and 
hence £13.7 million was required if the factory gates were not to be closed.121 Both parties 
were well aware that the sum would not be enough to get the car to the market, but the 
government were more pessimistic.122  
In negotiation, the Secretary of State explained that if the Conservative government 
had been presented with the same proposition as their predecessors they may well have said 
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no, but after due consideration they agreed under certain conditions. Namely, the loan was to 
ensure that the car could come to the market in December 1980 or January 1981, but that 
additional sums needed to be raised elsewhere.123 The loan was a mixed blessing for De 
Lorean. The loan helped alleviate the immediate cash flow problem; it made the firm liable 
for interest rate payments. A McKinsey monthly progress report by October 1980 predicted 
that market launch had slid further back to March 1981, but even that assessment could be 
overoptimistic.124 Furthermore, the dealership system was not holding together. The 
estimated selling price by October 1980 was now $25,000 (or 227 per cent of the original 
nominal estimated selling price).125 Moreover, De Lorean by November 1980 was refusing to 
adhere to NIDA’s instructions for him to abandon the Transbus project.126  
The firm’s cash flow problems, excessive cost base and weak demand became more 
and more apparent. Bank of America by January 1982 was no longer willing to provide 
export financing lending the money against the collateral of actual cars once they were 
shipped from Belfast. Bank of America invoked a safety clause that connected its lending to 
the sales volume generated by dealers. The poor (and declining) sales led the export credit 
offered to fall from $47 million to $24 million and soon after Renault cut off its credit for 
engines. De Lorean’s last attempt at getting UK taxpayer support was to lobby unsuccessfully 
the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD). In a final characteristic of extravagance, 
for a firm under receivership, De Lorean summoned his board back from Belfast to New 
York. The seven directors flew in Concorde at a total cost of £15,000.127 DMCL went into 
receivership in February 1982. Production ceased in May 1982 with a mere 200 staff kept on 
to service existing cars until the plant closed in October 1982.128 By November 1982 the firm 
was wound up and liquidators were appointed. DMC limped on until it too was forced into 
liquidation by the US courts in December 1983.129 
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As DMCL faltered, and the gap between promised and actual performance widened, 
so the political and economic sunk costs declined in importance. The failure of the firm to 
secure orders sufficient to match production ensured that a major plank of De Lorean’s 
argument for investment disappeared; furthermore, as the firm’s credentials as a potentially 
large employer of Catholics receded, and the accompanying political costs to Secretaries of 
States supporting the venture increased, so the bargaining power of DMCL declined. In terms 
of commercial sunk costs, the Conservative government became less and less convinced that 
this rationale provided a good one to continue subsidy. As the commercial problems of the 
firm intensified, so the influence of sceptics in the Treasury (and hence within Whitehall and 
Westminster) increased. Bargaining power hence shifted against further subsidisation.  
De Lorean’s declining effectiveness in bargaining for additional subsidy has been 
noted by journalistic commentators.130 De Lorean was fond of telling colleagues in New 
York that he had the British government ‘over a barrel’.131 The political sunk costs of closure 
were unarguably huge for the British government. Likewise, the damage to the region’s 
image as an investment location as well as the commercial sunk costs discussed by McKinsey 
raised further the prospective direct and indirect financial costs of failure. The supposed net 
benefits of the project helped initially override the Treasury’s scepticism. Greater initial 
scepticism would at the very least have made the subsidy package subject to tougher 
monitoring and restrained the business. The structure of the payoffs initially gave De Lorean 
a high degree of ability to secure rents (and a correspondingly large subsidy); his bargaining 
power declined between 1978 and 1982 and a new equilibrium emerged in which his access 
to rents dissipated; without these subsidies, the enterprise folded. 
 
 
Narrative: some industrial policy lessons  
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As noted earlier in the paper, solving the specific puzzle of the failure of DMCL 
relates closely to explaining the more general puzzle: namely, the overall failure of Northern 
Irish industrial policy. Since the 1970s and 1980s, the relative dangers of market and 
government failure have influenced academic discussion on the merits of industrial policy.132 
Public Choice would suggest that rent-seeking behaviour, as well as more general 
government failure considerations, could prevent successful industrial policy. From a 
comparative institutional perspective, we observe that industrial policy varies internationally 
in terms of its relative success. In particular, in the real world such policies always emerge 
within a world of second-best institutions. Policymakers, rather than implementing a fixed 
menu of first-best/ best-practice policies need to take account of how proposed solutions 
affect multiple distortions.133 Binding constraints can be removed in a variety of ways, some 
of which may be more politically feasible than others. Furthermore, binding constraints can 
evolve over time. The best-practice approach ignores context and downplays the institutional 
complications of real world policymaking. In contrast, the second-best institutional approach 
provides a more appropriate institutional context to the design and implementation of 
industrial policy.134 
Recent work on the political economy of industrial policy, which covers both 
developing and developed economies, indicates that the political equilibrium of a society 
(and/or institutional stickiness) determines the effectiveness of particular policy choices.135 
Hence, given political equilibriums, policymakers can try to either alter the equilibrium or 
work within the institutional environment generated.136 As Robinson has observed, while 
there are government failure problems inherent in designing and operating industrial policy, 
successful policy must be more likely when there is a clear focus on efficiency outcomes.137 
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This recent line of argument explains why more successful policy models did not emerge 
during the Troubles, but did elsewhere.  
The South Korean experience provides an example of a more successful alternative, if 
also imperfect, model for industrial policy. In this case, while scholars disagree about aspects 
of the industrial policy regime, there is consensus that it was a successful and well-targeted 
set of policies. It has been argued by advocates of the “developmental state” thesis that 
intervention (via subsidies, trade restrictions, administrative guidance, public enterprises or 
credit allocation) explains the success of its industrial policy.138 Other assessments of the 
strengths and weaknesses of South Korean industrial policy take a more sceptical view of the 
“developmental state” thesis.139 However, these alternative approaches suggest that factors 
such as favourable human capital endowment and a relatively equal income and wealth 
distribution as well as other policies related to export-led industrialisation help explain the 
success. For example, the absence of large-scale inequalities in South Korea ensured that the 
political pressure for redistribution, which could easily descend into rent-seeking, was 
diminished. Moreover, a dedicated bureaucracy further acted to restrain rent-seeking.  
Moreover, imitation of successful industrial policy may not be possible outside of the 
context it arose. Crafts has observed that the political-economic conditions that South Korean 
industrial policy model operated within might not be applicable in the case of an economy 
facing deindustrialisation.140 If Crafts is correct, then a successful imitation of the South 
Korean model would not have been possible in Northern Ireland for a variety of reasons. 
Firstly, industrial decline, compounded by political unrest, was the relevant political-
economic equilibrium. The Northern Irish industrial policy model, at it evolved during the 
1970s, and as exemplified by DMCL, represented one that relied to greater extent than the 
South Korean model on attracting mobile inward investment projects. Such a model of 
industrial policy has been found wanting elsewhere.141 Secondly, in contrast to the South 
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Korean conditions, the very existence of deep-rooted inequalities and sectarianism gave rise 
to the De Lorean project. Moreover, industrial policy in the Northern Irish context could not 
merely focus on promoting economic efficiency: as it had political and security objectives 
connected to employment creation. Overall, as exemplified by the case of DMCL, the 
desperation for inward investment created opportunities for rent-seekers. South Korea’s 
favourable investment environment was in contrast able to restrain rent-seeking. This 
favourable institutional environment could not have been replicated easily in the Northern 
Irish case. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
In terms of specific lessons from the rise and fall of DMCL, this paper has 
demonstrated that institutional structures and the ability to engage in rent-seeking take us 
further in providing an answer to the puzzle of DMCL’s failure than do narratives that rest 
solely on the personality flaws of its founder. More generally, in a world where rent-seeking 
exists and institutions are second-best, a Whiggish approach to business history is historically 
misleading as well as economically ill-informed. It is for good reason that industrial societies 
have recognized that different kinds of firms are simultaneously agents of innovation and 
predation.142 Business survival, under certain institutional configurations, and the associated 
wealth of an entrepreneur, indeed may actually involve social waste.143 Moreover, 
entrepreneurs may not take the institutional environment as given. Attempts at alteration or 
evasion of existing institutions can be illegal or legal. Findings surrounding institutions and 
entrepreneurship are particularly important for those scholars who suggest that that any ‘new 
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business history’ should seek to explain how different jurisdictions have come to consider the 
firm as a socially and morally responsible actor.144 
Responding to the recent invitation presented by de Jong, Higgins and van Driel, the 
evidence presented in this paper indicates that Whiggish narratives of business history should 
be replaced by accounts that incorporate and allow for more generalizations from institutional 
analysis. For example, historical puzzles can more easily resolved if the analytic narrative 
approach is followed; likewise, while case studies need to be retained by business historians, 
there is scope for a range of other empirical methods. As noted in the introduction, economic 
historians are being encouraged to shift towards a policy-driven approach.145 Business 
historians should learn from this shift. By offering insights for the conduct and design of 
contemporary industrial policy, based on archival analysis informed by modern economic 
reasoning, business historians may help ensure a healthy future for the discipline. In the 
process, they will create a ‘new business history’ as called for by de Jong, Higgins and van 
Driel that more closely matches the needs of contemporary business and policy-makers. 
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Table 1. Classifying Four Approaches in the Social Sciences 
 
 “Dirty” Empirical Work “Clean” Empirical Work 
Thin Description ANALYTICAL NARRATIVE Standard economics analysis 
• Constrained optimization 
• Statistical significance 
Thick Description Traditional anthropological, 
sociological, area studies political 
science work 
• Social forces and cultural 
analysis 
• Case study and 
ethnography 
Statistical Sociology and political 
science 
• “Kitchen sink” statistical 
analysis which throws 
everything in the right 
side of the equation in 
search of explaining the 
left side 
 
Source: Boettke, “Review”, 378. 
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Table 2. Factors Encouraging Rent Seeking and Productive Entrepreneurship 
 
 A) FACTORS MAKING RENT 
SEEKING AN ATTRACTIVE 
CHOICE 
B) FACTORS MAKING 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AN 
ATTRACTIVE CHOICE 
1. Market 
Size 
Large resources go to "official", rent-
seeking sectors, such as the 
government, army, or religion. Poorly 
defined property rights make wealth 
accessible to "unofficial" rent seekers. 
Large Wealth that is up for grabs, 
especially relative to smaller goods 
markets. 
Large markets for goods. Good 
communications and transportation 
that facilitates trade. 
2. Firm Size Substantial authority and discretion of 
rent seekers (such as government 
officials, army etc) enable them to 
collect large sums unhindered by law 
or custom.  
Easy entry and expansion, few 
diminishing returns in operations, 
access to capital markets. 
3. Contracts Ability to keep a large portion of 
collected rents. In firms, observability 
of output that yields appropriate 
rewards. 
Clear property rights, patent 
protection. No expropriation of rents 
by rent seekers. Ability to start firms to 
collect quasi rents on talent. 
 
Sources: Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny, “The Allocation of Talent”, 519. 
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Table 3. A Typology of Entrepreneurship and Some Illustrative Examples 
 
 ABIDE EVADE ALTER 
PRODUCTIVE Pursue a 
business 
opportunity 
within 
prevailing 
institutions. 
Sidestep stifling 
labour market 
regulations 
through a new 
contractual 
form. 
Provide a new 
local public 
good, private 
security firms.  
UNPRODUCTIVE/DESTRUCTIVE Sue competitors 
for a share of 
the profit. 
Rogue states; 
rivalry between 
warlords. 
Bribe a 
government 
official to obtain 
a contract. 
Illegal 
syndicates. 
Lobby for a 
new regulation 
to protect an 
industry. 
Repeal property 
rights to 
plunder a 
wealthy group. 
 
Source: Henrekson and Sanandaji, “Interactions”, 53. 
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Figure 1. Deaths and injuries (numbers) due to the security situation in Northern 
Ireland, 1969-1998 
 
 
 
 
Source: data taken from McKeown, Michael. (2009). Database of Deaths Associated with Violence in 
Northern Ireland, 1969-2001, (Version 1; dated 16 June 2009), [Microsoft Access Database; 1650KB]. Web: 
CAIN.  
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Table 4. Unemployment Rates (%), 1971-1991 
 
 Protestant  
(Male) 
Protestant 
(Female) 
Catholic 
(Male) 
Catholic 
(Female) 
1971 7 4 17 7 
1981 12 10 30 17 
1985-7 14 9 36 15 
1991 12 7 28 14 
 
Notes: Derived from census reports for 1971, 1981 and 1991; continuous Household Survey data for 
1985-7 
Source: Boyle and Hadden, Northern Ireland, 44. 
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Table 5. Projected and Actual Hiring Schedule for DMCL, 1979-1982 
 
Year Quarter Projected number of 
workers hired 
Actual numbers of 
workers employed in 
Dunmurry 
1979 1 90 - 
1979 2 120 - 
1979 3 180 - 
1979 4 283 - 
1980 1 505 - 
1980 2 780 - 
1980 3 1214 265 (including 23 on 
short-term contracts and 
16 hourly paid) 
1980 4 1404 430 approx 
1981 1 1497 865 
1981 2 1734 - 
1981 3 1810 1600 approx 
1981 4 1810 - 
1982 1 - 2500 approx 
1982 2 - 1500 approx 200 by May 
1982 
 
Notes: Projected employment figures (1979-81) taken from PRONI DMS/2/129 file entitled ‘IR Intelligence De 
Lorean Motor Cars Ltd’ held at PRONI, Belfast. The fourth quarter 1980 and first quarter actual employee 
numbers 1981 taken from Fallon and Srodes De Lorean, 284. Third quarter data 1981 taken from Ibid, 303. First 
and second quarter data for 1982 taken from Ibid, 413-4 and 431. 
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